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In his essay ‘Ideal argumentation,’ Michael Gilbert criticizes the pragma-dialectical
distinction between the resolution and the settlement of a difference of opinion or dispute. As
Gilbert understands it, there cannot be a resolution in the pragma-dialectical sense if a standpoint
has changed during a discussion; the result of the discussion must then be regarded as a
settlement, because within the framework of a critical discussion two parties in a dispute cannot
both change their stance and agree to some third standpoint. If their disagreement is in this sense
settled rather than resolved, their discussion is ipso facto not a critical discussion.
Gilbert thinks that the problems with the pragma-dialectical approach with regard to the
distinction between a resolution and a settlement arise, in the end, from “an insistence that a
categorization be applied too seriously.” He recommends a move away from the abstract (or
perfect) to the actual: what is needed is “a continuation of the acknowledgement explicit in van
Eemeren and Houtlosser that the ideal does not really exist and the rhetorical imbues all
argumentation.”
With this optimistic conclusion of Gilbert’s essay in mind I shall start my commentary on
his paper. As a stepping-stone I would like to take Gilbert’s observation that most logical
approaches to argumentative discourse tend to neglect the non-logical communicative properties
of argumentative discourse. As a pragma-dialectician, I cannot but agree with this observation.
This observation was in fact one of the fundamental starting points of the founders of the
pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. In addition to the recognition that a dialectical
approach to argumentation is to be preferred over a (mono)logical approach, the basic insight
was that a ful-blown theory of argumentation has to be ‘pragmatic’ in the linguistic sense. This
insight is brought to bear at the analytic level by developing a set of instruments for analyzing
argumentative discourse based on Searlean insight in the successful performance of speech acts
and Gricean insight in the rational conduct of communication. At the theoretical level it is
implemented by modeling a dialectical exchange as an interaction between speech acts in a
critical discussion. The model of a critical discussion thus developed serves, in turn, as a
heuristic device for the analysis of argumentative discourse with a view to a critical evaluation.
Gilbert might object that applying the model of critical discussion in the analysis of
argumentative discourse precisely shows that pragma-dialectics is not concerned with everyday
argumentation in everyday communication but with ideal argumentation in ideal communication.
He should see no reason to do so. As has been explained before, most emphatically by van
Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs in Reconstructing Argumentative Discourse,
pragma-dialectics is designed to cover any sort of argumentative discourse, including
argumentation in everyday conversation. The only feature that “lifts” pragma-dialetics, so to
speak, one level higher than the discourse itself is its normative interest in providing sustained
insights on how to enhance the quality of argumentative discourse where this is necessary.
Gilbert’s own remarks suggest that he does not eschew such aspirations. In his opinion, the
pragma-dialectic apparatus should surely have an application to discussions less critical than the
proclaimed ideal, because “there can still be analysis, recommendation, transformation, and so
on.” But how can there be “recommendation” without some norm or ideal? Let me emphasize
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that the pragma-dialectical term “ideal” is not identical with the colloquial word “perfect,” and
that a “critical discussion” is not an empirical text type or genre. Both notions are theoretical
constructs that do not “mirror nature.” This is not to say, however, that they are not to some
extent reflected in everyday discourse or that they cannot be fruitfully applied in the
interpretation, reconstruction, analysis, and evaluation of argumentative discourse. Empirical
research carried out by van Eemeren, Meuffels and Verburg (published in the 2000 volume of
Language and Social Psychology) has in fact shown that everyday arguers generally consider the
pragma-dialectical rules for the confrontation and opening stages of a critical discussion
acceptable and instrumental. In a series of meta-analytic reviews recently published in
Argumentation and Advocacy, Daniel O’Keefe has for a number of normative guidelines as those
developed in pragma-dialectics shown that the interviewees regarded following these guidelines
the most persuasive option. And Harry Weger concluded in a research review of small group,
interpersonal and relational communication (published in the 1998 ISSA Conference
Proceedings), among other things, that even quarelling couples prefer reasoned discourse along
the lines of critical discussion over simple assertion and counter-assertion.
Let me come to Gilbert’s criticism of the pragma-dialectical distinction between the
resolution and the settlement of a dispute. According to Gilbert, this distinction is problematic
and the problems “arise from an insistence that a categorization be applied too seriously” [italics
PH]. But, in fact, Gilbert’s arguments in support of his criticism of the pragma-dialectic
distinction are not really connected with his proclaimed annoyance with categorization. He rather
attempts to show that the distinction is not tenable. First, he claims, this distinction can only be
made if psychological considerations are included in the anlysis: the difference between a
resolution and a settlement may only reside in someone’s attitude. As Gilbert rightly observes,
pragma-dialecticians are known for their “avowed distaste for anything psychologistic” (just as
they are, pace Gilbert, known for their disaproval of any theoretical resort to the concepts of
‘truth’ and ‘belief’). So, supposedly they cannot always account for the difference. Leaving aside
that in the pragma-dialectical theory attitudes are dealt with in so-called “higher-order
conditions” that need to be satisfied for arguing in accordance with the rules of critical
discussion, I take it that Gilbert means either that the distinction cannot be made because it is not
always externalized; or that it cannot be accounted for when it is not externalized. As regards the
former I would respond that this is a matter of definition: a resolution is a final agreement
between the parties in a discussion, no matter whether actual parties ever finally agree with each
other or not; a settlement is a non-argumentative ending of a discussion, no matter whether any
discussion is ever decided in a non-argumentative way. As for the claim that the distinction
cannot be accounted for when it is not externalized, one can say that parties do not always
explicitly say whether they agree, but that there is often textual and contextual evidence that can
be appealed to in order to make out whether they agree or not. If no such evidence is available, it
may indeed be impossible to determine whether the parties have reached a resolution. The same
applies, mutatis mutandis, to determining whether the dispute is settled. This problem, however,
is a general analytic problem: sometimes there is simply not enough evidence to determine
whether a certain label applies. In a particular case it may, for instance, be unclear whether we
are dealing with an argument or not. It may also be unclear whether a certain person is Michael
Gilbert or not. But the fact that the available analytic or perceptual instruments sometimes fall
short, does not mean – I hope – that there are no arguments or that Michael Gilbert does not
exist.
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Gilbert’s second objection is substantiated by treating two exemplary dialogues in which
apparently some kind of resolution has been reached, but pragma-dialectics could not label it as
such, so that according to Gilbert it would – erroneously – have to be called a ‘settlement.’
Gilbert’s view of the first dialogue, in which two parties abandon their initial standpoints and
come to agree on a third standpoint, is that within the framework of a critical discussion the two
parties cannot be said to have resolved their original dispute. In his comment on the dialogue,
however, he says that “the interaction might have been [...] a critical discussion, or, at least, a
series of them. In other words, there was a critical discussion about A, then a second about B,
and, finally, a third about C. [...] So, it is possible that an argument such as this one could be a
critical discussion if it is allowed that the larger critical discussion be broken down, via
transformation, into smaller critical discussion units each of which resolves itself appropriately.”
What then, I wonder, is the problem? For Gilbert it is, once more, psychological: while the one
party (Susan) may be convinced, the other party (John) is, given the motives attributed to him by
Gilbert, merely accommodating – “he says he has been convinced, but he really has only been
persuaded [...] How, in this case, are we to determine that, really, a settlement rather than a
resolution has taken place?” Here is a pragma-dialectic answer: “We are not to determine this,
because, for philosophical and methodological reasons, we are not interested in what people
really mean but only in what they are committed to on the basis of what they have said,
explicitly or implicitly.”
Gilbert’s second example is designed to illustrate that interesting arguments are by
definition arguments that result in a settlement. No dispute over initial standpoints is ever just
resolved: conditionals are added on the way, Toulminian ‘rebuttals’ are included, and initial
standpoints are made more precise. All these operations prompt the analyst, says Gilbert, to
speak of a settlement rather than a resolution. “Part of the difficulty [for pragma-dialectics]
arises,” says Gilbert, “from an oversimplification of the ideal of ‘position’.” But, again, Gilbert’s
conclusion is unjustified. In fact, the opposite is true: Gilbert’s difficulties stem from a nontechnical use of pragma-dialectical terms such as “position” and “standpoint.” In the pragmadialectical model parties are at all stages of the discussion allowed to ask for a so-called language
declarative – an elucidation, an explanation, a definition, a specification, et cetera. If, as a result
of this, a standpoint is made more precise, or restricted in scope, or constrained to a particular
context, analytically speaking, the original standpoint is retracted and the modified standpoint is
discussed. If, in the end, the parties come to agree on the acceptability of the modified
standpoint, they have established a resolution to their dispute if ever there was one.
To conclude, I return to the issue Gilbert ends his paper with. Should arguers in everyday
argumentative discourse be assumed to be aiming merely at a resolution of their disputes? No. In
the project Frans van Eemeren and I are working on, it is explicitly acknowledged and duly taken
into account that arguers will and may aim for a resolution in their own favor. This is the “happy
change” Gilbert alludes to in his paper. He sees it as an acknowledgement that “the ideal does
not really exist, and that the rhetorical imbues all argumentation.” It will be clear by now that the
view that the “ideal” does exist has never been upheld in pragma-dialectics. As for the claim that
the rhetorical imbues all argumentation, a few additional considerations may clarify our position.
We do agree that “the rhetorical imbues all argumentation,” but in our view this does not mean
that ‘the rhetorical’ should be the primary point of view in the critical analysis and evaluation of
argumentation. Nor do we think that it should be the point of departure when accounting for the
strategic rationale of the moves that are made in everyday argumentative discourse. In our view,
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the rhetorical functions of argumentative moves are to be explained and accounted for on the
basis of the dialectical functions of such moves in a critical discussion. Only then is it possible to
explicate, and to account for, the critical constraints that most rhetorical theorists require of
rhetoric but have so far not been able to provide. More importantly, our approach makes it
possible to explain why rhetoric is not just mere rhetoric. Our emphasis on the primacy of the
dialectical framework enables us to make it clear that rhetoric consists primarily in keeping up a
commitment to reasonableness, i.e., a commitment to being engaged in a process of bringing
about rational conviction rather than mere persuasion. We think that the possibility of making
this commitment explicit would be lost if we took rhetoric, instead of dialectic, as our point of
departure.

